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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OLEOMARGARINE LAW
OF PENNSYLVANIA.
In 1885 the legislature of the state of Pennsylvania passed
a law anacting that "no person, firm or corporate body shall
manufacture out of any oleaginous substance or any compound. of
the same, other than that ,produced from unadulterated milk or
cream from the same, any article designed to take the place of
butter or cheese produced from pure, unadulterated mi&k or cream
from the same, or of any imitation or adulterated butter or cheese,
nor shall offer for sale, or have in his, her or their possession
with intent to sell the same as an article of food".
This enactment of the Pennsylvania legislature, as it must
appear to an observer, is not designated to prevent any deception
in the manufacture or sale of the article of oleomargarine or any
attempt to pass it off as butter made from pure milk or cream.
The act simply prohibited the manufacture, sale or keeping for
sale of the article, though. no concealment is attempted. as to its
character, natuire, or ingredients.
The legality and constitutionality of this statute came
before the courts of the state of Pennsylvania and later before
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Of Commonwealth
vs. Powell, 127 U. S., 679. Defendant upon the trial offered
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to prove that the oleomargarine was a healthy and nutritlous article
of food, and that the oleomargarine in question had been manufact
ured prior to the passage of the act forbiddin its manufacture,
sale and so forth and in pursuance of the then existing law of the
state; but this evidence was excluded as being immaterial and
irrelevant. Defendiant was convieted in the state court and the
conviction was affirmed upon the appeal to the United States
Supreme Court by a divided court.
Two questiens arose in this case,- (1) whether a state can
lawfully prohibit the manufacture of a healthy and nutritious
article of food designed to take the place of butter, out of any
oleaginous substance, or compound of the same, other t an that
produced from pure milk or cream, and its sale when manufactured?
and (2) whether a state can, without compensation to the owner,
prohibit the sale of an article of food, in itself healthy and
nutritious, which has been manufactured in accordance with its laws
The great fundamental rights guaranteed by our constitutions,
both State and Federal, are life, liberty and property. The
first of these rights has been everywhere respected by the
legislatures and. protected by the courts, but those of liberty
and property, have in some instances been overlooked, disregarded
and trampled upon.
Liberty is the right ndt only of freedom from servitude,
imprisonment or restraint but the right of one to use his facilities
in any and all lawful ways, to live and work when he will, to earn
his livelihood in any lawful calling and to pursue any lawful
trade or vocation. (1)
In constitutional law liberty means not merely to move about
unrestrained, but such liberty of conduct, choice and action as
the law gives and protects. Liberty is classified as natural,
civil and political liberty. Natural liberty is commonly employed
in a somewhat vague and indeterminate sense. One man will
understand by it a liberty to enjoy all those rights whiah are
usually regarded as fundamental, and which all governments should
concede to their subjectc; but as it would not be necessary to
agree what those are and the agreement could only be expressed in
the form of law, the natural liberty, as far as the law could
take notice of it, would be found at a loss to resolve itself into
such liberty as the government of every civilized people would be
expected by law to define and protect. Another, from natural
liberty, may inderstand that freedom from restraint which exists
(1). Anderson's Law Dictionary.
People vs. 'Tibson, 1)" . Y., 389,
People vs. Marx, 597N. Y,, 377.
Slaughter House Cases 16 Wallace, 106.
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before any government has imposed its limitations@ But as without
government only a savage state could exist, and any liberty would
be only that of the wild beast, in which every man wuold have
an equal right to taxk~and to hold whatever his agility, courage,
strength or cunning co-ild te$ure, but no available right to movd,
it is obvious that a natural liberty of that sort would be incon-
sistent with any valuable right whatever. A right in any valuable
sense can only be that which the law secures to its possessor,
by requiring others to respect it, and abstain from its violation.
Rights are then the offsprinS of law; they are born legal restraint
Civil liberty is the condition in which rights are established
and protected by means of such limitations and restraints upon
the action of the individual members of the political society
as are needed to prevent what would be injurious to other indivduals
or prejudicial to the general welfare. This condition may exist
in any country, but its extent and secutities must depend largely
upon the degree of political liberty which accompanies it.
Political liberty may be defined, says Cooley, "as consisting in
an effectual participation of the people in the making of the laws!
Liberty in its broadest sense, means the faculty of willing
and the power of doing what is willed without inflaence or re-
stvaint. It means self-determination, unrestrainedness of action.
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Thus defined God alone can be absolutely free or have absolute
liberty. So soon as we apply the word liberty to spheres of
human action, the term receives a relative meaning, because the
power of man is limited; he is subject to constant influences from
without. If the idea of unrestrainedness is applied to the
social state of man, it receives a limitation still greater, since
the equal claims of the unrestrained action of all necessarily
involve the idea of protection against interference by others.
We thus come to the definition that liberty of social man consists
in the protection of unrestrained action in as high a degree as
the same claim of protection of each individual admits of, or in
the most efficient protection of his rights, claims, interest, as
a man or citizen, or of his humanity manifested as a social being.
The word liberty applied to man in his political state may be viewt&o
with reference to the state as a whole, and. in this case means the
independence, of the state, of the other states; or it may have
reference to the relation of the citizen to the ,government,
in which case it is called political or civil liberty; or it may
have reference to the status of a man as a political being, as
contradistinguished from him who is not considered master over
his own body, will or labor; as in the case of a slave. This is
called personal liberty, which, as a matter of course, includes
freedom from servitude and imprisonment.
Liberty, tnat fundamental guarantee of our constitution,
that very foundation upon *,hich our grand and noble country was
established, that principle which has been the means of bringing
the United States to ite present high and exalted position, that
principle for which our forefathers embarked from their homes
beyond the sea, sought freedom on this glorious continent and
fought and died on the bloody battle fields of the Revolution,
is now, after years of its sacred observance, years of prosperity,
and years of happiness, to be lost sight of, to be disregarded,
and to be entirely ignored by an incompetent, inferior, and
unconstitutional enactment of a state legislature, and. to be
sanctioned and Upheld by the highest court of what was once and
what should be still, "the land of the free and the home of the
brave". Judge Dillon in his admirable work on "Jurisprudence in
England and America" says, "we cannot but express our regret
that the constitution of any of the states, or that of the United
States, admits of a construction that it is competent for a state
legislature to suppress (instead of regulating) under fine and
imprisonment thh business of manufacturing and selling a harmless
and even wholesome, article, if the legislature chooses to affirm
contrary to the fact, that the public health or public policy
requires such suppression. The record of the convistion of
Powell for selling without any deception a healthful and nutritious
article of food makes one's blood tingle.
The era of the despotism of the monarch, among the people
of our race has passed away. One cannot fail to see that what is
now to be feareo and guarded against is the despotism of the
majority. The statesmen who formed our republican institutions
were fully alive to those gruat truths. They were neither
visionaries nor socialists. In Burk's address to the kin g, occurs
a passage as follows:- "What, gracious sovereign, is the empire
of Ameriaa to us, or the empire of the world, if we lose our own
liberties?"
All of the original states in their first constitutions and
charters provided for the security of private property as well as
oflife and liberty. This they did either by adopting in terms
the famous thirty ninth article of Magna fharta which secures
the people from arbitrary imprisonment and arbitrary spoliation, or
by claiming for themselves all the liberties and rights set fort-h
in that great charter. On the admission into the Union of subse-
quent states, the constitutions of each contained similar provision
These circumstances alone show conclusively the ideas with which
the states were formed, and the principles of their foundation.
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The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution recites or
commands that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use without just compensation." This provision
was taken from Magna Charta and is both meamorable in its origin
and has stood for more than five centuries as the recognized
bulwark of t: e Englishman to ;e secure in his personal liberties
and possessions.
No less a strong unbeliever in popular government than Sir
Henry Maine, speaking of the American Union and its unexampled
career, was constrained, in 1885 to confess and declare that
"all this beneficent prosperity reposes in the sacredness of
contract and the stability of private property; the first the imple-
ment, and the last the reward, of success in the universal competi-
t ion."
As a result of the civil war, the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution was adopted in 1868 which among other
things ordained "nor shall any atate deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."
This amendment was aimed at every form of state action whether
constitutions, statutes, or judicial decrees, that deprived any
9.
person, white or black, natural or corporate, of life, liberty,
or property. This Fourteenth Amendment has been spoken of by
judge Dillon in the following terms, "I believe it will hereafter1
more fully than at present, be regarded as the American compltment
of the Great Charter, and be to us as the Great Charter was and
is to England,- the source of perennial blessings." The Fourteenth
Amendment binds life, liberty and property indissolubly together,
it puts them on an equal basis of security, it places them under
the care and protection of our national government, it makes them
all, not only blessed privileges, but in an impressive and
solemn form, the absolute, fundamental, and indestructible national
rights of every citizen. This amendment like all others should be
enforced by the judiciary as one of the departments of our govern-
ment established by the constitution.
It has been most beautifully, appropriately and truly declared
that "it is the loftiest function and rost sacred duty of the
judiciary, unique in the history of the world, to support, maintain
and give full effect to the constitution against every act of the
legislature or executive in violation of it. This is the great
jewel of our liberties. This is the final breakwater against the
haste and the passions of the people, against the tumultuous
ocean of democracy. It must at all'costs be maintained. This
- 10.
done and all is safe; this omitted, and all is put in peril and
may be lost."
Property in its apprppriate sense means that dominion or
indefinite right of user and disposition which one may lawfully
exercise over particular things or subjects, and generally to the
exclusion of all others, yet the term is often used to indicate the
thing or subject of the property. The word extends to every
species of valuable right and interest including real and personal
property, easements, franchises and other incorporeal hereditamonts
Property does not consist merely of the title and possession, but
it includes the tight to ma ke any legal use of such title and
possession, or th subject matter itself, and to sell and transfer
it. (2) The term property embraces everything that goes to make up
ones wealth or estate, and everything that is the subject of
ownership. (3) Labor has frequently been held to be property. (4)
Mr. Austin has said that "the ownership of property is a right
residing in a person, and property is any right of a person over
(1). Williston Seminary vs. County Commissioners, 147 Mass.427
Ins. Co., vs. Allen, 43 N. Y., 389.
(2). Kuhn vs. Common Council, 70 Mich., 537.
(3). Baker vs. State, 109 Ind., 58.
Stanton vs. Lewis, 26 Conn. 449.
People vs. R. R., 84 N.Y., 565.
Logan Co. vs. Weld Co., 12 Col., 152.
Carleton vs. Carleton, 72 Maine, 116.
(4). Matter of Jacobs, 33 Hun, 379.
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a thing indefinite in point of user." Property has been
defined as being "the right to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of
a thing", and includes choses in action. (1). The right which
an insolvent debtor has in a policy of insurance on his life
payable to him in case he survives a certain day, passes to his
assignee as "property". (2). The profession of a priest is his
property, and a prohibition of the exercise of that profession by
his bishop without accusation or hearing is contrary to the law
of the land (3). The right to take and prosecute an appeal was
held property in California (4). A right of action is as much
property as is a corporeal possession (5).
In In Re Parrot, 1 Fed. Rep., 481.
Wilson vs. Codman, 3 Cranch, 206.
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wallace, 127.
(1). Winfree vs. Ba-Jey, 102 N. Car., 515.
Car&eton vs. Carleton, 72 Maine 116.
Ide vs. Harwood, 30 Minn. 195.
Society vs. Austin, 46 Cal., 416.
Fling vs. Goodal, 40 N. H., 215.
Fin. Dept., vs. Steamship Co., 106 IN.Y., 571.
(2). Smith vs. Dickinson, 40 Mass., 171.
Wilson vs. O'Donnell, 147 Mass. 20.
Pierce vs. Insurance Co., 138 Mass., 151.
(3). 0'Harv vs. Stack, 90 Pa. St., 477.
(4). Dreschback vs. R.R., 57 Cal*, 464.
(5). Hubbard vs. Brainard, 35 Conn., 563.
Griffen vs. Wilcox, 21 Ind., 370.
Johnston vs. Jones, 44 Ill., 142.
Power vs. Harlow, 57 Mich., 111.
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Depriving a proprietor of the beneficial use and enjoyment of his
lands is as m-ch a taking and an appropriation of his property,
as is the taking of the land itself (1).
From the vastness, extensiveness and indefiniteness of the
tenm property, this statute of Pennsylvania is clearly a, palpably
a violation of the constitutional guaranty of property. This act
is not a regulation, but an actual and absolute prohibition.
By this statute Powell is deprived of the incidents and essentials
that accompany ownership and property as, the right to use in any
lawful manner, the right to sell or transfer, the right to realize
upon the article, and the right of enjoyment. lie looses the labor
he may have put upon the article and the money expended in its
purchase, and so forth, he even is deprived of reaping the benefits
of labor put upon and money expended, prior to the passing of the
act, and in accoddance with the law at the time of the outlay.
Has it uome to this, that one must anticipate the future actions
of legislaturesor shall we adhere to the principle of justice,
equity qnd sound sense, and act accordin to the law as it exists
at the tinme of su,.h action?
It has been supposed that this statute could be justified
(1). Grand Rapids Co. vs. 1,.orris Jarvis, 30 Mich., 309.
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under the head of that indefinite, much abused, and very convenient
authority, of an all wise legislature, known and designated as the
police power. The police power, in its broadest acceptation, means
the general power of a government to preserve and promote the
public welfare.
It is difficult if not impossible to define the exact scope
of the term. The Supreme Court of the United States has declined
to do so, stating that it would only determine each case as it
arose. A good definition, at least as good as could be readily
given, was declared in a Louisiana case as follows, "the police
power is the right of the state functionaries to prescribe regula-
tions far the goodorder, peace, protection, comfort and convenience
of the community which do not encroach on the like power vested
in Congress by the Federal Constitution.
Police power is to be distinguished from the right of eminent
domain, the former being devoted principally to the care and
preservation of the public health and morals andiis commonly
exercised 1.n restricting the actions of individuals and in re ulat-
ing and not prohibiting the use of property, while the latter
is employed for the advancement of a means of commerce, transporta-
tion and for public convenience, and involves always the appropria-
tion of private property. Hollingsworth vs. Parish of Tensas,
17 Federal Reporter, 109.
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Private prorty can only be taken, appropriated or damaged
for public use through the exercise of the single principle of
eminent domain, which in all vases carries with it the right of
just indemnity. Therefore, under the exercise of its general
police power, which extends only to the regulation of the owners
use and dominion of private property, a state cannot take, appropri-
ate, or damage private property, so as to deprive the owner of
its dominion, use, control or profits. The matter of taking
private property under power of eminent domain is now largely
regulated by constitut&ons or statutes providing for just
compensation.
Under the authority of the police power, a state shall pass
such laws as may be necessary for the preservation of the public
health (1). For this purpose a state may forbid or restrict
such trades and pursuits, or such uses of private property, as
would prove injurious to the health of the community. The preserva-
tion of the public morals is an object of scarcely less importance
than that of the public health, and laws for this purpose are a
(1). Butchers Union vs. Cresceht City Co., 11 U.S., 746.
Gall vs. Cincinati City, 18 Ohio St., 563.
Wartman vs. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St., 202.
Blydenburg vs. Mills, 39 Conn., 485.
People vs. Arensberg, 105 N.Y., 125.
Butler vs. Chamber, 36 Minn., 69.
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very proper exercise of the police power. Under the head of laws
for the "general welfare" may be classed many cases whcre the state
for the welfare and safety of its citizens, may authorize the dis-
truction either of animals affected with dangerous diseases, in
order to prevent the spread. of such diseases, or of animals
injurious to the general public, or pass laws forbidding- houses
of inflammable material to be constructed or repaired within
certain limits of a city etc., or the keeping of gun-powder and
other explosives in large quantities in cities etc. The building
of such houses may within certain limits be prohibited, but a
house already constructed there cannot be molested (1).
While it seems that everything necessary for the promotion
and preservation of the puhlic welfare may be done by the legisla-
ture in the exercise of the state's police power, it mu,'t be remem-
bered that there are two written constitutions; State and Federal
fixing the limits which may not be transcended. Like others powers
of government, there are constitutional limitations upon the
exercise of the police power.
The legislature cannot under pretense of exercising this
(1). Clark vs. Bank, 117 Pa. St., 326.
Salem vs. Maynes, 123 Mass., 372.
Wadleigh vs. Gilman, 12 Maine, 403.
Brady vs. Insurance Co., 11 Mich., 425.
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power, enact laws not necessary to the preservation o' the health
and safety of the community that will be oppresive and burdensome
upon the citizen* If it should do so it is the duty and function
of the courts to declare such an act void. (1). It is the privilege
of the law making power to determine where the exi-ency exists
for the calling into exercise the police power of the state,
but what are the subjects of its exercise is clearly a judicial
question (2).
The Constitutional limitations upon the police power referred.
to above are (a) "no state shall pass any law impairing the
obligation of contracts" (b) "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law",(c)
Regulations of interstate commerce. (d) Privileges and immunities
of citizens of the several states.
"Due process of law", which is a provision found in both
State and. Federal Constitution, cannot mean less than a prosecution
or suit instituted and, conducted according to the prescribed forms
and. solemnities for ascertaining guilt, or determining the title
to property, it means in each particular case, such an exertion
of the powers of government as the settled maxims of the law
(1). R. R. vs. Jacksonville, 67 Ill., 37.
(2). Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cem. Co., 70 Ill., 192.
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permit and sanction. It is difficult to define with precision
the exact meaning and scope of this phrase. Any definition which
might be given would probably fail to comprehend all the cases
to which it would apply. It is probably wiser, as has been stated
by Mr. Justice Miller of the United States Supreme Court, "to
leave the meaning to be evolved by the gradual process of judicial
inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision
shall require, with the reasoning on which such decisions may be
founded". It may however be stated generally that "due process
of law" requires an orderly proceedingadapted to the nature of the
case, in whidh the citizen has an opportunity to be heard, and
to defend, enforce and protect his rights. Kent in his comnentar
ies says,"the better d~finition of due process -)f law is that it
means, law in the regular course of administration through covXrts
of justice." This phrase was undoubtedly intended to convey the
same nkaning as the words "by the la,'. of the land" in Magna Charta
and by the law of the land is most clearly intended the general lag
a law which hears before it condems, which proceeds upon inquiry
and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is that every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and immunities
under the protection of the general rules which govern society.
Due process of law duubtless means, in the due course of legal
18.
proceedings, according to those rules and forms which have been
established for the protection of private rights. Such an act as
the legislature may, in the uncontrolled exercise of its powers
think fit to pass, is in no sense the process of law designated
by the constitution, as due process of law or the law of the landl)
Although fundamental principles of natural right and justice
cannot, in themselves, furnish any legal restrictions upon the
governmental exercise of the police power in the absence of
constitutional limitations, express or implied, yet they play an
important part in determining the exact scope and extent of the con
stitutionallimitations. Whenever by reasonable construction the
constitutional limitations can be made to avoid an unrighteous
exercise of the police power, that construction will be upheld
notwithstanding the strict letter of the constitution does not
prohioit thd exercise of such power. The unwritten law of this
country is in the main against the exercise of the police power.
The guaranty that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law is not construed in any
narrow, restricted or technical sense, but liberally and always
in favor of carrying out the guaranty. The right to life may be
(1). Westervelt vs. Gregg, 12 N.Y., 209.
Rogers vs. Torbut, 58 Ala., 528.
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invaded without its destruction. One may be deprived of liberty
in a constitutional sense without putting his person in confinement
Property may be taken without manual interference therewith, or
its physical destruction. The right to life includes the right of
the individual to his body in its completeness and without its
dismemberment, the right to liberty, the right to exercise ones
faculties and follow any lawful vocation for the support of life,
the right of property, the right to acquire property, to convey it
and enjoy it in any way consistent with the equal rights of
others and the just exaction: and demands of the state (1).
In several of the sLates oleomar: arine statutes have been
passed, but all can be distinguished from this act by tre state of
Pennsylvania.
The act of New Hampshire of 1885 prohibiting the sale of
imitation butter, unless colored pink, being intended to prevent
fraud on the public in the sale of provisions is within the
police power of the state (2).
Maryland passed an act in 1884 requiring all oleomargarine
sold to be stamped as such, is clearly a valid exercise of the
police power of the state, being passed for the prevention of
(1). Bertholf vs. O'Reilley, 74 N.Y., 509.
(2). State vs. Marshall, 64 N.H., 549.
20.
fraud (:1).
In New York a statute, similar to this enactment in Pennsylvan
ia, was held unconstitutional by the unanimous judgment of the
court of appeals in People vs. Marx, 99 N.Y., 377. The court hold
ing that is was a denial of the liberty of the contract secured
to the citizens by the constitution, that the right not only
included freedom of the person from restraint but the right to
follow such industrial occupations as he might see fit, and that
the act was a palpable invasion of private rights (2).
In New Jersey a statute prohibiting the sale of oleomargarine
colored to imitate butter was held valid, the object to be to
prevent fraud. The court said;"if the sole basis of the statute
was the public health, the objection that oleomargarine is a
wholesom food would be pertinent". This is directly agtinst
the decision in the Powell Case.
The case of Plumley vs. Mass., recently decided by the United
States Supreme Court, involved the question of inter-state commerce
and held that the statute of Massachusetts prohibiting the sale
of oleomargarine made in imitation of yellow butter produced
froc pure milk or cream, wis a valid regulation of the police
(1). Pierce vs. State, 63 Md., 592.
(2). People vs. Arensburg, 105 N.Y., 123.
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power, and prohibits the sale of oleomargarine manufactured in
Illinois according to its laws, shipped into Massachusetts and
sold in the original packages. That it was not a regulation of
inter-state commerce, but an act for the prevention of fraud.
The opinion of the court in this case distinguished it from the
case of Leisy vs. Hardin, 135 U.S., 100 which held that beer was
a subject of exchange, traffic and commerce, and. its sale while
in the original packages in which it was carried from one state
to another state, could not without the assent of congress be
forbidden by the latter state, the distinction being thatin the
Leisy case the beer was genuine beer, not designed towork fraud
on the public and thus could not be prohibited by the state into
which it was shipped so long as it was sold in the original
packa; es, while in the Plumley case there was deception in the
manufacturing of the article, it was not what it was represented.
to be, it would have worked a fraud upon the people of Massachusett*
and therefore a proper instance for the exercise of the police
power.
While the court's opinion in the Plunley ca:'e did not decide,
it gave every evidence that a statute like the one in Pennsylvania
wo-tld not prohibit the sale of oleomargarine shipped into Pennsyl-
vania, from another state, and sold as oleomargarine in original
packages.
22.
The act of Congress of August 2, 1886 entitled "An act
defining butter, also imposing a tax upon and regulating the
manufacture, sale, importation and exportation of oleomarr-arine,"
recognizes oleomargarine as a commodity and an article of commerce.
This statute of Pennsylvania was entitled "an act for the
protection of the public health, and to prevent adulteration
of dairy products and fraud in the sale thereof." Clearly this act
was fraudently entitled, it was launched under a false banner.
It does not accomplish what is indicated from its title, ii. never
was expected to prevent, nor was it passed for the purpose of
preventing fraud or preservine health, but for the dastardly
purpose of benefiRtt*ne industry to the detriment of another,
which is wholly foreign to our beloved principles of liberty and
equality, and plainly unconstitutional. It doesn't protect the
general health, for how can the prohibition of a healthful and
nutritious article benefit or preserve either health or morals.
It does not prevent fraud, for the oleomargarine was not soLd
as butter, but under and by the nams of oleomargarine and was
so labeled. It was not even coloreC to look like or irfita1.e
butter in any way, but was natural in every respect. It was not
sold at butter prices, but at the price of oleomargarine. Then
wherein lies the fraud?
23.
A law does not necessarily fall under the class of police
powers or regulations, because it is passed under the pretence of
exercising euch powers, as in this case, by a false and fraudulent
title, purporting to protect the health and. prevent the co-mission
of fraud upon the public. It must have in its provisions some
relation to the end to be accomplished. If the act which is
forbidden is not injurious to the health or morals of the public,
if it does not disturb the peace or threaten the aafety of the
public, it is not a valid exercise of t'e police power and is
nothing move or less than an nnwarranted and unrighteous interfer
ence with the rights and liberties of the citizen.
If the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, can prohibit the manufac-
ture and sale of this a-rticle of oleomargarine, it most certainly
can prohibit the like production and disposal of any other article
of food. If it can deprive Powell of the proper ty he had acquired
in.this oleomargarine under and by the law of the Commonwealth,
it undoubtedly can prohibit the sale of all prepared foods, as
extracts of beef, manufactured according to its laws, and thus
destroy the property right which was obtained under its existing
laws.,
In prohibiting the sale of this article, which had been
manufactured lawfully bly the defendant Powell, the legislature
24.
necessarily destroyed its mercantile value. True it is, that if
the article eould not be used without injury to the health of the
community, its sale might not only be prohibited but the article
itself might be destroyed. But here the article was healthful
and nutiitious and in no respect injuring the health of any one.
It was manufactured pursuant to the laws of the commonwealth,
then how could the state forbid its sale or use without compensa-
tion at least, and such a prohibition is nothing less than
confiscation. Any act which declares that the owner shall neither
sell it nor dispose of' it, nor use and enjoy it, confiscates it,
depriving him of his personal property without due process of law.
In People vs. Marx, before referred to, the court in the
course of its opinion said;"The result of the argument is that
if, in the process of science, a process is discovered of preparing
tallow, lard, or any other oleagineous substance, and communicating
to it a palatable flavor, so as to render it serviceable as a
substitute for dairy butter, and equally nutritious and valuable,
and. thearticle can be produced at a comparatively small cost,
which will place it within the reach of those who cannot a-fford
to buy dairy butter; the ban of this statute is upon it. Whoever
engages in the business of manufacturing or selling the prohibited
product is guilty of a crime; the industry must be suppressed;
those who could make a living by it are deprived of that privilege
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that liberty and that right; the capital invested in the business
must be sacrificed, and such of the people of the state as cannot
afford to buy dairy butter must eat their bread unbuttered."
Who can say that the constitutional principles of liberty,
property and equality, are not infringed and violated by this
law of Pennsylvania, which absolutely prohibits an important and
commendable branch of industry for the sole reason that it competes
with another, and may i'educe the cost of an article of consumption,
to the benefit and profit of humanity. Instead of placing upon
such ingenuity, the condemnation of the law with its fine and
imprisonment, it should be sanctioned and its possessor commended
and encouraged#

